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This chapter compares and contrasts international experience with respect to higher education 
financing. The size and payment forms of tuition, and the different types and levels of public 
sector support, are illustrated for a large number of countries. A major aspect of the 
discussion concerns the conceptual bases and the costs and benefits of the two different 
instruments of government intervention for student financing: guaranteed bank loans, and 
income contingent loans. It is argued that income contingent loans have a number of 
advantages over government guaranteed bank loans, and this seems to be increasingly 
recognised with respect to international adoption of the former. However, to be efficacious 
income contingent loan systems require sophisticated institutional and administrative 
repayment collection arrangements. 
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Introduction 
There are very many possible ways to finance higher education and this is illustrated in what 
follows with respect to the systems of a large number of countries. We consider in depth 
conceptual issues related to the costs and benefits of different approaches to student loans. 
Income contingent loans are emerging as a mechanism to deliver financial assistance to 
students, and international reforms in this area are examined in some detail.  
 
Descriptions of Higher Education Financing Systems 
International comparisons of tertiary education expenditure 
The financing of higher education varies greatly from country to country. Among the 
developed economies of the OECD, spending on higher education institutions averaged 1.4 
per cent of GDP in 2003, which is about the same as a decade ago. Expenditures range from 
less than 1 per cent of GDP in Italy up to almost 3 per cent of GDP in the USA (see 
Figure 1). The variation in spending reflects large differences in both enrolment rates and in 
expenditure-per-student.  
On average, 24 per cent of tertiary expenditures in the OECD were financed privately 
in 2003. This is a marked increase from 1995, when the average was only 19 per cent, though 
that partly reflects changes in the composition of countries within the sample. In some 
countries (the United States, Korea, Japan and Australia), most spending is from private 
sources (see Figure 1). In others, including most European countries, almost all spending is 
by the government.    2
Figure 1 
Expenditure on tertiary education institutions: OECD countries 
percentage of GDP, 2003 
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1  Countries are ranked by level of private spending. 
2  In Switzerland private spending data is not available. 
3  For further notes and qualifications, see source 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2006, Table B2.1b. 
Notwithstanding these variations, government subsidies are substantial in every 
industrialised economy. The rationale for this government support for higher education is 
controversial. For example, it is often said that tertiary education is a right, not a privilege. 
But the same might be said of food or clothing, which governments do not heavily subsidise. 
A more concrete argument is that subsidies permit children from less-wealthy families to 
undertake higher education, promoting equality of opportunity. That argument is powerful 
when the only alternative is the free market. However, as discussed below, other government 
policies, such as provision of student loans, can facilitate access without large subsidies. 
Perhaps the most common argument in the academic literature is that higher education 
provides benefits to others, not just the student — so it is fair and efficient that society pay a 
share of the cost. Examples of these benefits or externalities include technological innovation 
and civic participation. In practice, estimating the size of these benefits is difficult. So while 
there is widespread agreement, in principle that governments should contribute to some of the   3
costs of higher education there is also disagreement as to how large that contribution should 
be. 
International comparisons of tuition fees 
As might be expected, countries that finance higher education privately tend to have high 
tuition fees, and this is illustrated in Figure 2 which also shows differences between private 
and public institutions. Estimates across countries are not precisely comparable but the 
ranking of countries is not very sensitive to measurement issues. In particular, tuition is 
relatively expensive in the United States, Korea and Australia, and tuition is low, or even 
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1  Countries are ranked by average tuition fee, weighted by full-time enrolment. 
2  Tertiary type-A institutions mainly comprise bachelor's degree programmes, but also include masters and 
professional degrees and some academically-oriented associates degrees. 
3  Where data is provided as a range, the midpoint is used. 
4  For further notes and qualifications, see source 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2006, Table B5.1. 
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Other costs 
The direct education costs described above typically represent a small share of the total cost 
of attendance. Students also need to pay for room, board and other living costs. Estimates of 
these tend to be highly judgemental and are difficult to compare. As one indicator, 
governments and educational institutions in the United States typically base financial aid 
packages on the assumption that students need about $US10,000 to $11,000 per annum to 
live on. That compares with an average tuition fee of around $US8,000. In other countries, 
estimates of both living costs and tuition fees tend to be lower, but the former outstrip the 
latter by even wider margins. The sum of tuition and living costs (less scholarships and 
grants, discussed below) represents the amount that needs to be financed by the typical 
tertiary student. 
Students with ready access to finance will recognise that living costs would be 
incurred regardless of whether or not they study and hence are not relevant to the choice as to 
whether to enrol. The opportunity cost — the resources that are sacrificed in order to enrol — 
is foregone income. An illustrative estimate is the median earnings of a 20-year old high 
school graduate in the United States, around $22,000 a year. This exceeds the cost of tuition 
at almost all institutions, a difference that is even greater in other countries. Hence although 
public discussion often emphasises fees as a barrier to education, the bigger disincentive is 
foregone earnings and the need to finance living costs. Furthermore, although tertiary 
education is often described as free in many countries, the size of living costs and foregone 
earnings means that large contributions are nevertheless required on the part of the student. 
Different kinds of public support 
The form of public support for higher education also differs widely. In all OECD countries, 
direct spending on institutions accounts for the majority of public spending on tertiary 
education. Indeed, in many countries (for example, Switzerland, Poland and Portugal) it is 
almost the only form of support. Elsewhere, however, substantial support is provided through 
households in the form of grants and loans. Grants may be based on academic performance 
(when they are often called scholarships) and/or means testing, either of family or individual 
income. Loans may be provided directly from the government, indirectly through a 
government guarantee of a commercial bank loan, but increasingly financial assistance from 
governments is taking the form of an income contingent loan, and this reform is considered in 
detail in following sections.    5
From Figure 3 it is apparent that New Zealand is the OECD country that relies most 
heavily on loans, while Denmark relies most on grants. The OECD loan estimates shown 
represent the gross amount directly lent by government, plus subsidies to private lenders. For 
some purposes, this overstates the budgetary cost of loans, as repayments are excluded. 
Meanwhile, it may understate the importance of guaranteed private loans. In principle, it 
would be desirable to also include tax concessions; however comparable international 
estimates are not available. 
Figure 3 
Public subsidies to households as a percentage of  
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1  Countries are ranked by share of public spending flowing through households. 
2  Loans are measured as gross amount directly lent by government, plus subsidies to private lenders.  
3  For further notes and qualifications, see source 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2006, Table B5.2. 
The relative merits of grants, loans, direct institutional funding and tax concessions 
are strongly debated. Researchers have endeavoured to measure the costs and benefits of 
these alternative policies but effects are not always clear. One simple piece of evidence is 
presented in Figure 4, which shows that countries with large loan programs tend to have 
above-average enrolments. There are several possible explanations for this, including reverse 
causation. However the most usual interpretation is that the ready availability of finance 
facilitates access to higher education. Sections following consider the conceptual bases of 
different policy approaches to student loans.   6
 
Figure 4 
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1  The entry rate is the proportion of people entering tertiary type A programs for the first time. It differs from 
enrolment rates in that comparability between countries is not distorted by different course lengths. 
2  Loans are valued as the gross amount directly lent by government, plus subsidies to private lenders. 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2006, Tables B5.2 and C2.1. 
Conceptual Issues Concerning Student Loans 
The need for student loans 
A significant financing issue for higher education discussed above is that there is a case for 
both a contribution from students and a taxpayer subsidy. The next important question is: is 
there a role for government beyond the provision of the subsidy?  
An understanding of the issue is facilitated through consideration of what would 
happen if there were no higher education financing assistance involving the public sector. 
That is, a government, convinced that there should be a subsidy, could simply provide the 
appropriate level of taxpayer support to higher education institutions, and then leave market 
mechanisms to take their course. Presumably this would result in the institutions charging 
students up-front on enrolment for the service.  
However, there are major problems with this arrangement, traceable in most instances 
to the potent presence of risk and uncertainty. This critical point was first raised by Friedman.   7
The argument can be best understood with reference to the nexus between labour markets and 
human capital investments. The essential point is that educational investments are risky, with 
the main areas of uncertainty being as follows as discussed by Barr, Palacios and Chapman: 
(i)  Enrolling students do not know fully their capacities for (and perhaps even true 
interest in) the higher education discipline of their choice. This means in an extreme 
they cannot be sure that they will graduate with, in Australia for example, around 25 
per cent of students ending up without a qualification;  
(ii)  Even given that university completion is expected, students will not be aware of their 
likely relative success in the area of study. This will depend not just on their own 
abilities, but also on the skills of others competing for jobs in the area;  
(iii)  There is uncertainty concerning the future value of the investment. For example, the 
labour market — including the labour market for graduates in specific skill areas — is 
undergoing constant change. What looked like a good investment at the time it began 
might turn out to be a poor choice when the process is finished; and 
(iv)  Many prospective students, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, may 
not have much information concerning graduate incomes, due in part to a lack of 
contact with graduates. 
These uncertainties are associated with important risks for both borrowers and 
lenders. The important point is that if the future incomes of students turn out to be lower than 
expected, the individual is unable to sell part of the investment to re-finance a different 
educational path, for example. For a prospective lender, a bank, the risk is compounded by 
the reality that in the event of a student borrower defaulting on the loan obligation, there is no 
available collateral to be sold, a fact traceable in part to the illegality of slavery. And even if 
it was possible for a third party to own and sell human capital, its future value might turn out 
to be quite low taking into account the above-noted uncertainties associated with higher 
education investments. 
It follows that, left to itself — and even with subsidies from the government to cover 
the value of externalities — the market will not deliver propitious higher education outcomes. 
Prospective students judged to be relatively risky, and/or those without loan repayment 
guarantors, will not be able to access the financial resources required for both the payment of 
tuition and to cover income support. There would be efficiency losses (talented but poor   8
prospective students would be excluded), and distributional inequities (the non-attainment of 
equality of educational opportunity). Government intervention of some form is thus required. 
The capital market failure with respect to higher education financing is apparently 
understood by the governments of most countries, given that public sector loan interventions 
are commonplace internationally. Until recently, government intervention often took the form 
of public sector guarantees for commercial bank provision of education loans, but over the 
last decade or so has increasingly involved income contingent loans. While quite different in 
practice, both approaches are motivated in part by the recognition that, left alone, higher 
education markets will function poorly.  
The costs and benefits of conventional student loans 
A possible solution to the capital market problem described above is used in many countries 
is the provision of student loans — either directly by the government or indirectly through 
guarantees to banks. Typically, and most simply, these loans involve fixed repayments, as, 
for example, with a house mortgage. While this seems to address the capital market failure, it 
raises problems of default.  
Students face an important default issue. This is that some may be reluctant to borrow 
for fear of not being able to meet future repayment obligations. Not being able to meet 
repayment obligations has the potential to inflict significant damage to a person’s credit 
reputation (and thus access to future borrowing, for example, for the purchase of a house). 
These concerns imply that there will be less borrowing than there would be in the absence of 
this default concern. 
A reluctance to borrow due to the uncertainty of repayment constitutes what might be 
labelled an ex ante default problem for prospective students. There is also an ex post 
problem, which is that a proportion of those students who took the credit risk of borrowing 
for a human capital investment will end up not being able to repay because of low incomes. 
In these circumstances default imposes a potentially large cost on those unlucky borrowers 
who do poorly in the labour market. Significantly, research suggests that members of the 
default group are predominantly those who ultimately experienced relatively high 
unemployment rates and relatively low earnings. 
The prospect and consequences of a student defaulting on a loan obligation is a 
potentially critical issue for borrowing to finance human capital investments, due to the 
uncertainties noted above. A consequence is that some eligible prospective students will not   9
be prepared to take bank loans. This problem can be traced, in part, to the fact that bank loan 
repayments are insensitive to the borrower’s financial circumstances.  
The bottom line is that, even though government assisted conventional loans are a 
common form internationally of public sector involvement in higher education financing, 
such an approach has several apparently very significant weaknesses. 
The costs and benefits of income contingent loans 
A final approach to student financing involves income contingent loans, such as Australia’s 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), introduced in 1989. The attraction of these 
schemes is that they can be designed to avoid the problems associated with alternative 
financing policies.  
First, there is no concern with intra-family sharing so long as the scheme is universal. 
That is, no students would be denied access through the imposition of means-testing 
arrangements that could exclude some whose parents or partners are unwilling to help. 
Second, given an efficient collection mechanism, there is no default issue for the 
government. That is, if the tax system is used to collect the debt (at least for Australia, this is 
essential because the Australian Taxation Office is the only institution with reasonably good 
information on a former students’ income), it is extremely difficult for the vast majority of 
graduates to avoid repayment. There is a small default issue in that some students will not 
pay back in full, because income contingent systems are designed to excuse some former 
student’s payments because their lifetime incomes are too low. Harding (1995) calculates that 
the total repayments remaining uncollected because of the nature of HECS would be of the 
order of 20 per cent for the original scheme (when the repayment conditions were much more 
generous for the student (before the 1996/97 changes)). Other reasons loans may not be 
repaid include death and emigration. 
Third, because repayments depend on income, there should be no concerns by 
students with respect to an incapacity to repay the debt. That is, once an individual’s income 
determines repayment, and so long as the repayment parameters are sufficiently generous, it 
is not possible to default because of a lack of capacity to pay. This is the critical practical 
advantage of income contingent collection schemes — unlike any other form of assistance, 
there is insurance against default. 
Income contingent schemes have significant advantages over alternative financing 
arrangements, in that they can be designed to avoid the major problems of their alternatives.   10
This does not make such approaches a panacea generally, however: for an income contingent 
scheme to be made operational it is essential that there is an efficient administrative 
collection mechanism.  
The matter of collection is of great importance for the introduction of income contingent 
loans in countries without the necessary institutional apparatus. Chapman argues that the 
minimum conditions for a successful income contingent loan seem to be: 
i)  accurate record-keeping of the accruing liabilities of students;  
ii)  a collection mechanism with a sound, and if possible, a computerised record-
keeping system; and 
iii) an efficient way of determining with accuracy, over time, the actual incomes of 
former students. 
While most OECD countries will have income tax systems that enable efficient collection 
of income contingent debts, it is very unlikely that developing countries have the capacity 
to meet requirement (iii) above. 
 
International Reforms in Student Loan Systems 
Background 
Friedman’s suggested policy response to the capital market problem involved a type of 
graduate tax in which former students would repay their debts as a percentage of their 
incomes for a given period of time. It was not until the 1970s that a more conventional 
income contingent loan arrangement was first introduced, unsuccessfully, by Yale University. 
The policy approach received a major boost involving the use of the national income tax 
system for collection with the introduction of the HECS in Australia in 1989, followed by 
quite similar policy reforms in other countries. These experiences are now reviewed briefly. 
The Yale Plan 
Yale University introduced an ICL in 1972, which was extended in 1976 but discontinued 
several years later. Apart from loans being repaid depending on income, the scheme had the 
feature of borrowing being of a group loans form, in which there was mutual responsibility 
between members with respect to the repayment of the total debt. Chapman (2006) 
categorises the Yale scheme as a risk-pooling ICL.   11
Individual repayments were not unlimited, however, with a cap being defined at 150 
per cent of the borrower’s loan. This then became a buy-out option for former students 
wishing to discontinue in the program (Palacios, 2003). Even so, risk-pooling necessarily 
meant that high income earners covered the unpaid debts of low income earners and those 
who defaulted for other reasons. High initial default rates eventuated, predicted by Nerlove in 
(1975) because of moral hazard, and the scheme was discontinued. One of the major 
problems with the Yale scheme was that the university was ill-equipped to act as the 
collection agency.  
Sweden  
Prior to 1988, Sweden had a student loan system with fixed repayments and heavily 
subsidised interest rates. In 1988 repayments were made a flat 4 per cent of income, with 
less-subsidised interest rates. In 2001, following concern about interaction between these 
income-contingent repayments and the country’s already high marginal income tax rates, this 
scheme was replaced by one in which repayments are initially low, then increase based on a 
formula that takes into account the students outstanding debt, the prevailing interest rate and 
an annual escalator (Usher, 2005). There is little available evidence of the effect of the 
scheme. 
Australia  
As noted, in 1989 Australia instituted a broadly based risk-sharing income contingent loan 
charging system for higher education, known as the Higher Education Contribution Scheme. 
HECS seeks to recover a part of tuition costs, and the system does not involve student income 
support. In Australia student income support takes the form of means-tested grants[increase 
font]. Students incur a debt which is repaid according to future incomes, there being at the 
time a first threshold of repayment of around average Australian earnings. The Australian 
Tax Office is the collection agency. 
Payments are progressive and, after the debt is incurred, there is a real rate of interest 
of zero. The interest rate regime is more complicated than this however, because if a student 
chooses to pay up-front they (currently) receive a 20 per cent discount. This means that 
HECS implicitly has a rough form of a real rate of interest, in that those choosing to pay later 
initially incur a higher level of debt, although the difference obviously reduces in present 
value terms over time. The discount could be seen to be Australia’s way of encouraging what 
are called parental contributions.    12
There has by now been considerable research on the effects of the introduction of 
HECS on a critical issue for policy, the consequences of the scheme for the access of 
relatively disadvantaged prospective students. The conclusions from the Australian research 
with respect to socio-economic mix and access are as follows.  
(a)    The introduction of HECS was associated with aggregate increases in higher 
education participation; and 
(b) HECS did not result in decreases in the participation of prospective students from 
relatively poor families, although the absolute increases were slightly higher for 
relatively advantaged students. 
Both findings raise some important discussion points. With respect to the first, it 
doesn’t follow that HECS per se resulted in an increase in the demand for higher education. 
Indeed, if this were the case it would constitute a curiosity for economic theory, since the 
result would suggest that increasing the price of a service increases also the quantity 
demanded. Indeed, an important finding from many disparate case studies is that the socio-
economic mix of higher education students seems fairly insensitive to funding regimes. That 
is, marked changes in the levels, incidence and nature of grant and loan support systems (and 
tax and other fiscal incentives) do not seem to affect significantly the proportion of 
enrolments of students from different family wealth backgrounds. 
The other important finding from HECS is that the collection of the debt is apparently 
quite efficient in administrative terms. That is, the Australian Tax Office estimates put the 
collection costs at around $25 million annually, or less than 3 per cent of yearly receipts. 
Administratively the system seems to have worked well.  
New Zealand 
Third, after Sweden and Australia, New Zealand adopted an ICL scheme in 1991 that shares 
several features of HECS. Specifically: 
  loan repayments depend on an individual’s income, and are collected through a tax 
system which made this simple in operational terms; and 
  a first income threshold of repayment, after which there is a progressive percentage 
rate of collection. 
The New Zealand arrangements differ importantly to those introduced in Australia. In 
particular:   13
  the loans are designed to cover both university fees and some living expenses, 
although there is also a system of means-tested grants for students from poor 
backgrounds;  
  initially the loans carried a market rate of interest, but now the nominal rate is zero so 
there is a negative real rate of interest; and 
  until recently universities were free to set their own fees.  
A potential advantage of the New Zealand scheme is that universities have discretion 
over the prices charged, and receive the tuition revenues directly. This implies that in New 
Zealand there is the prospect of resource allocation effects within the higher education system 
as a result of the direct nexus between the prices charged and the revenue received. In 2005 
the Australian government suggested reforms more along these lines. There is little direct 
evidence of the effects of the New Zealand ICL on the access of disadvantaged prospective 
students.  
The Republic of South Africa 
The Republic of South African introduced an ICL in 1991, known as the National Student 
Financial Aid Scheme. NSFAS was motivated essentially by a concern that without 
assistance the marked racial skewing of the higher education system away from non-white 
students would remain. While bursaries could have been used instead of ICL, it was 
considered that the costs involved “… would not be financially sustainable” (Jackson, 2002, 
p. 83). The scheme initially provided resources to about 7,500 students, but by 2002 this 
number had risen to over 100,000, or more than 20 per cent of South Africa’s higher 
education students. 
Resources are distributed via the universities, with preference going to prospective 
students who are both poor and academically able. That is, unlike other national schemes, the 
South African ICL involves means testing on the basis of family income at the point of entry 
to higher education. 
There are two major differences between the South African approach and those used 
in both Australia and New Zealand. The first concerns the first income level of repayment, 
which at about $US5,000 is very much lower than the thresholds used in other countries’ 
ICLs. Second, in the first instance the student repays directly to the lending institution. That 
is, the taxation system is not the first port of call, but is instead a last resort. Employers are 
required to be involved only when a student is apparently not maintaining expected debt   14
repayments. It is unclear how much this adds to administrative costs, but it would seem to 
suggest that collection would necessarily be relatively expensive. Jackson argues that the 
annual administrative costs are less than 2 per cent of the total value of loans distributed. The 
more important figure however would be costs as a proportion of revenues collected, data not 
reported.  
The UK 
Higher education financing policy over the last 15 years or so in the UK has been 
characterised by considerable change. In 1990 a loan scheme was introduced, but collection 
was not based on a former student’s income. In 1997 an ICL was initiated which took the 
following form: students from poor backgrounds were excused from paying any tuition, 
while students from rich families incur the entire debt. In between, the debt obligation is 
determined by means of a sliding scale. This decision seemed to reflect a concern by the 
government that relatively disadvantaged students would be more likely than others to find an 
ICL a deterrent to higher education participation, a view at variance with the evidence from 
the HECS experience reported above. In 2006 the UK Government announced further 
reforms to higher education financing. The major changes are: 
  the introduction of price discretion for universities, but with a cap of 3,000 pounds per 
full-time student year; and 
  the introduction of tuition for all students, but with the poorest being provided with 
subsidies.  
As with the Australian and New Zealand schemes, the UK ICL policy is likely to be 
relatively inexpensive to administer. This is because income tax arrangements in these 
countries greatly facilitate the operation of ICL. As pointed out by Chapman this is far from 
the case with respect to developing countries, where public administrative challenges related 
to the collection of ICL loom large. 
The US 
In 1993 the Clinton Administration introduced broadly based reforms to student loan 
programs. One noteworthy aspect of the reforms included an option for students to adopt 
income contingent repayments for some part of their loan obligations, with the ICL obligation 
being 20 per cent of disposable income.    15
The ICL reforms introduced in the US have not worked well. With respect to take-up, 
for example, in 1999 only 7 per cent of the eligible student population initially chose to repay 
their loan obligations through the ICL option, though 26 per cent of borrowers consolidating 
(bundling) their loans choose ICL repayments. The basis for low take-up of ICL in the US 
seems to have two, arguably closely related, explanations. In broad terms these are: the poor 
design characteristics of the scheme; and the government's ineffectiveness in explaining and 
publicising accurately the scheme’s implications for student debt and repayment obligations. 
It is possible that both weaknesses reflect a lack of ICL policy commitment on the part of 
those with US policy influence. As of mid 2007, the US Congress was considering legislation 
that would substantially expand the income-contingent component of its existing loan 
programs. 
Other countries 
Other countries have introduced income contingent loan systems, but in general it is not 
obvious that these have been successful. Chile’s 1994 scheme ran into significant collection 
problems (the tax system was not used), and the Thailand income contingent loan reforms of 
2006 have now been suspended arguably in part because of concerns with both the extent of 
taxpayer subsidies and matters of collection. Israel is close to implementing an ICL, and there 
active debates concerning the costs and benefits of such arrangements underway in a large 
number of countries. 
 
Conclusion  
As variations between countries and over time may indicate, there are no definitive answers 
to how higher education should best be financed. Nevertheless, as indicated above, there is a 
trend towards both decreases in direct taxpayer support and increased reliance on student 
loans, particularly those with income contingent repayments. International organisations such 
as the OECD, IMF and World Bank routinely recommend their members move in this 
direction, and the OECD, for example, describes income contingent student loans as 
international best practice. That assessment, however, is based in large part on economic 
reasoning rather than solid evidence, although data consistent with the predictions of the 
conceptual arguments are accumulating. A critical issue concerns the collection of ICLs, and 
it is difficult to believe that for many developing countries that this approach can currently 
work.    16
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